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Debating Trump 2.0 and Implications for Africa – The Multiple Pressures on Civil Society Organizations

Megatrends spotlight 58, 04.09.2025

The USAID cuts put strain on Africa’s underfunded civil society organizations and fuel debates about their legitimacy. While CSOs need to diversify their funding sources, European donors should invest in narratives that support an independent civil society and shift their funding to advocacy. 

Lillian Ddungu, 68, right, teaches sewing to youth as part of a program by the NGO Health Nest Uganda, November 25, 2024, in Entebbe, Uganda.

After an initial 90-day review, the US administration finally decided to cut 86 per cent of all USAID’s programmes in March 2025. The African continent was hit particularly hard by the cuts. In 2024, 31 per cent of USAID’s foreign assistance was allocated to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Institute for Security Studies estimates that the cuts could push 5.7 million Africans into poverty in 2026. 

While public debate mainly focuses on the devastating consequences of the cuts in the health sector, USAID’s significant contribution to funding civil society organizations (CSOs) is much less discussed. Yet, the United States (US) was by far the largest provider of aid to CSOs. Their contribution of USD 11 billion (2023) accounts for 40 per cent of the entire budget for aid to CSOs recorded by the 33 Development Assistance Committee member countries. Even though Germany ranks second, it will hardly be able to close the gap, contributing a mere USD 2 billion. According to estimates by the Center for Global Development, all USAID awards in the category “civil society” have been cut for the fiscal year 2024/25.

These cuts coincide with other major donors reducing aid: for the first time in nearly 30 years, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the US all cut their official development assistance in 2024. According to the OECD, cuts in the government and civil society sector (comprising human rights, democratic participation and civil society, and public sector reform) are projected to amount to between 21 per cent and 36 per cent from 2023 to 2025. At the same time, civic space is shrinking globally. These factors combined raise questions about the future of CSOs in Africa and beyond.

Reduced Salaries, Layoffs, and Closure

The immediate effects of the cuts are hard to quantify. Yet, several small-scale, non-representative surveys were conducted amongst civil society membership organizations that convey first impressions. According to a global survey by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies among NGOs active in the humanitarian field, 67 per cent of the respondents received stop work orders. A survey by the “EU Supporting an Enabling Environment for Civil Society” initiative found that 72 per cent of respondents were affected by the cuts. Of those, 38 per cent reported that more than 25 per cent of their budgets were affected. Similar figures were reported by the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum that surveyed CSOs in Eastern Europe. A survey by the Accountability Lab and Humentum reveals that 64% of all respondents had USAID projects terminated. More than half report that they had to lay off or furlough staff and roughly a third indicate that their organization is at risk of closure. 

Organizations need to adjust their operations to deal with the funding loss. Accountability Lab Mali reports different measures that CSOs across the country adopt to save money, such as reducing salaries, shifting staff to other funding lines, temporarily sending their staff to work from home to save utility costs in the office and allow staff to save transport costs, and terminating contracts for office space contracts and/or services. In the long run, if organizations do not want to reduce their activities, they will need to diversify funding sources and/or rely more on volunteers. Some CSOs increasingly look into philanthropic sources of funding or turn some of their operations into income-generating activities as social enterprises.

Funding Cuts Reinforce the Legitimacy Crisis of CSOs

Simultaneously, the funding cuts are justified by narratives that undermine civil society legitimacy. Not only did Elon Musk claim that USAID was supporting terrorist organizations, but US Congressman Scott Perry falsely stated that USAID funded Boko Haram. These statements add fuel to authoritarian governments’ narratives discrediting civil society actors as foreign agents, money launderers or terrorists and can serve as a justification for more repressive legislation.

The one-dimensionality of the narrative stifles any meaningful debate about the complexity of funding CSOs in authoritarian contexts. As research shows, CSOs’ allegiances in authoritarian and politically volatile settings are often fluid, and funding them comes with inherent risks. Yet, CSOs can also act as critical defenders of democracy and human rights in authoritarian settings and are often the only actors able to mobilize opposition. 

Authoritarian governments also use the US administration’s take on women’s and LGBTQI+ rights to back up their discriminatory policies. For instance, Trump’s election was welcomed by members of the Ugandan parliament who had accused the Biden administration of promoting homosexuality in Uganda. According to Ugandan CSOs, the funding cuts have already led to a rise in hostility and discrimination towards affected communities. In addition, the negative implications of the funding cuts on Africa’s free press have also been documented.

While these developments reinforce the already existing dynamic of shrinking civic space, CSOs’ legitimacy is also being questioned from within the aid sector. CSOs have long been criticized for being donor-dependent, both financially and in terms of agendas. The increasing professionalization of CSOs and a focus on service delivery, are widely acknowledged as being at the expense of more transformative change that CSOs could effect as advocates for human rights and democracy.

European Civic Space is also Affected

European countries have also introduced more repressive laws regulating CSO activities in the past years, reflecting a growing sentiment of mistrust towards CSOs. The recent discussions started at the EU level by the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) about how NGOs allegedly are contracted by the European Commission to lobby companies on their behalf in the fields of climate and health is just one example. While the allegations were largely based on false claims, the outcome is the creation of a working group that scrutinizes European Union funding of NGOs for which the EPP was backed by the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists group and the far-right Patriots for Europe in the vote. As a result, public trust in CSOs is likely to erode further as newspaper headlines feature “secret contracts” paid for by taxpayer money. Hence, not only is the funding of CSOs abroad (as part of development cooperation) being questioned in European countries, but the legitimacy of domestic CSOs is also increasingly under attack.

Way Forward

We know from academic research on the effects of past aid reductions in the civil society sector that aid cuts shrink the sector and decrease services for beneficiary populations. Organizations tend to look for more domestic state funding to cover their losses, which potentially opens the door to co-option. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that cuts usually hit professional organizations the hardest. Grassroots and activist organizations are much less dependent on foreign funding. Thus, the current crisis might also be an opportune moment to revitalize the sector and re-focus on civil society’s civic mandate. Despite the difficult conditions, the case for CSOs to hold authoritarian governments to account, fight for human rights and democracy is stronger than ever. 

Here, the role of European donors is twofold. First, they need to invest in narratives that showcase the importance of an independent and strong civil society not only abroad, but also at home. The legitimacy crisis is just as important to address as the funding crisis. Second, even if they might not be able to fill in the gaps left by the closure of USAID, they can play an important role in routing funding to those actors that can make a difference. This means less service delivery, but a strong focus on locally-led organizations that advocate for democracy and human rights. In order to do so, donors need to have trustworthy local networks to ensure that organizations act in line with their values.

As has been argued elsewhere, civil society partnerships are not just “optional add-ons”, but an integral part of Europe’s foreign relations. They serve as allies who can provide important sources of information in difficult contexts. Indeed, maintaining CSO partnerships should remain one of Europe’s core interests.

Dr Lena Gutheil is a researcher at Megatrends Afrika and an Associate with the German Institute of Sustainability and Development (IDOS).

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