Assessing 25 Years of Partnership between the AU and EU: Closer Cooperation in Peace and Security

On 24 and 25 November, African and European heads of state and government will meet in Luanda, Angola, for their seventh joint summit. In addition to issues of economic cooperation and trade relations, migration and multilateralism, peace and security will also be an important topic of discussion. Instead of making general statements about the importance of their partnership in this area, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) should take concrete steps to deepen their cooperation in conflict prevention and peace mediation, the protection of critical infrastructure, and security and defence policy cooperation.

Cooperation in Peace and Security: from a Model of Success to a Test of Endurance

Cooperation in the field of peace and security has always been one of the central pillars of AU-EU relations and is often cited as one of the areas of cooperation in which a good and reliable partnership has developed. Through the African Peace Facility (APF), the EU contributed around three billion euros between 2004 and 2021 to African peace missions, institutional capacity building, short-term crisis prevention, and peace mediation. This long-standing support likely explains why the discussions on this topic at the last summit in February 2022 were relatively uncontentious. Consequently, the section on peace and security in the summit's final communiqué primarily reaffirmed existing thematic priorities for cooperation. Essentially, these are EU financial support for African-led peace operations, cooperation on military training and capacity building, and a general commitment to civilian crisis prevention.

Since the last summit, however, the outlook for AU-EU cooperation on peace and security has changed noticeably. In recent years, the number of armed conflicts on the African continent has continued to rise – in particular, clashes between non-state violent actors such as militias and rebel groups increased sharply in 2024. There has also been an increase in jihadist violence, particularly in the Sahel region. Russia's war against Ukraine has completely changed the security and threat situation in Europe. In the context of the "Zeitenwende", many European governments are increasingly focusing their attention primarily on national and alliance defence in Europe. In African countries, the war is primarily felt through its impact on food security and economic consequences, but it has also led to heated debates in some states about how to position themselves in the new geopolitical competition.

Crisis of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Parallel to these trends in conflict, a crisis in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been observed for several years. This comprises the AU and eight African regional organisations and provides specific institutions such as the Panel of the Wise advisory body, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force and the AU Peace Fund. With regard to African-led peace operations, however, there has recently been a trend away from established APSA structures towards ad hoc and unilaterally led missions – such as Rwanda'smilitaryintervention in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region or the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. At the same time, the financing of AU-led peace operations remains precarious. For example, the future of the AMISOM successor mission AUSSOM in Somalia is not secure. One reason for this is the failure to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on the use of UN funds for African peace operations, whose application to Somalia is currently being blocked by the US administration.

In the area of peace mediation, too, the AU has not succeeded in establishing itself as the leading mediator in current conflicts such as those in Sudan, Libya or the Democratic Republic of Congo, nor has it been able to contribute to stable peace processes. In fact, the AU has been unable to play more than a minor role in the various peace efforts in these conflicts.

EU support for ad hoc coalitions such as the G5 Sahel and MNJTF, as well as increased cooperation with individual African states in the area of armed forces capacity building, has also contributed to weakening APSA. With the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the abrupt end of MINUSMA and EUTM Mali, political attention in many European capitals has shifted from African crises, such as in the Sahel region, to the eastern neighbourhood.

What Messages the EU-AU Summit Should Send

These developments raise fundamental questions about the strategic coherence and prioritisation of European engagement for peace and security in Africa – particularly with regard to the future allocation of resources and political support for African peace initiatives. The summit should therefore send two clear messages with regard to cooperation in the field of peace and security. 

Firstly, the EU and its Member States remain strongly committed to peace and security in Africa and are prepared to make concrete offers to African partners to further deepen the cooperation. Emphasising this is not trivial, because since Russia's war against Ukraine, many African partners have gained the impression that Europe as an actor in security and peace policy will now turn away from Africa and focus solely on defending Europe against Russia. Here, it is important to put forward a credible counter-narrative that emphasises the EU's reliability as Africa's peace and security partner.

Secondly, support for the role and capabilities of the African Union remains at the heart of the EU's commitment to peace and security in Africa. Strengthening cooperation with the regional organisation is important in order to support the AU's role as a key player in crisis prevention and peacekeeping on the continent, especially at a time when the fragmentation of the African institutional landscape is increasingly calling this role into question. 

In addition to these important political messages, the AU and the EU could provide concrete impulses for deeper cooperation in three areas in particular.

Closer Cooperation through Joint Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation

Firstly, the summit communiqué should contain concrete measures to expand cooperation in conflict prevention and international peace mediation. This is an area of cooperation in which both partners have gained a lot of experience in recent years. At the same time, the AU and the EU face the challenge of continuing to contribute effectively to peace efforts as regional organisations in the face of geopolitical tensions and increasing interference by external actors – both in conflicts and in peace processes. Strengthening cooperation, which also enables mutual learning, could be achieved, for example, by establishing a standing consultation mechanism on peace mediation, within which exchanges on specific conflicts such as those in Sudan, Mali or Ukraine could take place and joint strategies could be developed. Such a mechanism would add an operational element to the annual Structured Dialogue on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation between the two organisations, established in 2023. The mutual secondment of liaison officers to the respective mediation teams of the AU and the EU could also support cooperation on specific crises and conflicts.

Closer Cooperation through Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection

A second area for deepening cooperation is cybersecurity and resilience building to counter hybrid threats, particularly with regard to the protection of critical infrastructure. Cooperation is already underway to build the cybersecurity capabilities of African regional organisations and their member states through EU programmes such as Cyber4Dev and Safe Digital Boost Africa. Cooperation on protecting critical infrastructure could be intensified, particularly in connection with ongoing and planned Global Gateway flagship projects. This is because investments in the construction of critical infrastructure such as power lines, transport routes and data networks are only sustainable if these infrastructures can be protected against hybrid threats.

Closer Cooperation through Security and Defence Partnerships

Finally, the AU-EU summit could promote the deepening of the EU's security and defence cooperation with individual African states. Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has implemented 16 support measures for 14 African partner armies since 2021, thereby supporting the development of the military capabilities of individual states. Such measures can, in principle, contribute to peace and security, but should be embedded in political partnerships and designed in such a way that they support, in particular, those military capabilities (e.g. air transport, tactical reconnaissance) that African states could contribute to AU-led peace operations. The latter would also help to ensure that greater diversification of partnerships contributes to strengthening the AU's capabilities in the area of peace and security.

One possible instrument for strengthening bilateral cooperation could be the so-called security and defence partnerships launched by the EU with the Strategic Compass in 2022. So far, eight such privileged partnerships exist with Western allies, but not with African states. At the summit, the EU could make a concrete offer to enter into such security and defence partnerships with African states as well, thereby taking security cooperation with them to a new level. Possible candidates for such privileged partnerships could be South Africa, Ghana or Kenya, with which so-called security and defence policy dialogues already exist.

In view of the immense challenges to peace and security in Africa and Europe, the African and European Union should seize the opportunity to deepen their cooperation beyond general commitments by taking concrete decisions and setting the course for the future.

PD Dr Julian Bergmann is a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). He has published numerous academic articles on EU foreign and development policy and on Africa-EU cooperation in the field of peace and security.