

Policy Brief 27 SEP 2024

Communicating Strategically about What? Europe and China in the Kenyan Media

Karoline Eickhoff, Paul Bochtler, Hesbon Hansen Owilla

European actors are increasingly relying on strategic communication tools in their external relations, especially in key partner countries like Kenya. To do so, they need to gauge public opinion trends in the country in relation to European cooperation and other key external actors. Based on a large-scale media screening and interviews with media experts, this paper examines which issues related to the EU/Europe and China have received the most media coverage in Kenya over the past decade (2013–2023). The paper finds, among other things, that European actors involved in communication efforts increasingly need to communicate about the EU’s role in global affairs and the impact of European decisions, products, and standards on African markets, without resorting to a “West versus China” framing.

In an environment of geopolitical competition, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), China, Russia, and others have all stepped up foreign policy efforts to sway public opinion in foreign countries in their favour.¹ Strategic communication and public diplomacy are the orders of the day. Efforts range from organizing public events and placing opinion pieces in local newspapers to image campaigns on social media. On the one hand, these efforts focus on their own reputation, by communicating compelling messages about themselves. On the other hand, they focus on “competition”, seeking to track and counter external information interference which is assessed as propaganda or disinformation. Foreign audiences and their perceptions are at the heart of these diverse communication and outreach initiatives.

Many of these initiatives focus on African countries. The EU, for example, seeks to project an image of Europe as an example of successful regional integration and as a “normative power” in foreign affairs.² European actors are encouraged to communicate investments and projects more visibly in line with European values and strategic interests. In Africa, they seek to present the EU as a strong partner in trade, investment, and development cooperation that can compete with Chinese offers. For example, the Global Gateway Initiative has

¹ For example, see: Maria Repnikova and Keyu Alexander Chen, “Asymmetrical Discursive Competition: China–United States Digital Diplomacy in Africa”, *International Communication Gazette* 85, no. 1 (2023), 15–31.

² Nathalie Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners,” in *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners*, ed. Nathalie Tocci (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2008), 1–22.

been promoted as an alternative to Chinese infrastructure offers.³ Since February 2022, European actors have also sought to rally global support for the condemnation of Russia's war on Ukraine.

China has also stepped up efforts to improve its image in the world and to counter “Western” negative coverage of Chinese activities in Africa. China has long portrayed itself as a developing country with a shared history with Africa that translates into today's “all-weather friendships”, pursuing a narrative of “who has done more for Africa?”⁴ Chinese journalists are encouraged to “tell China's story well”, for instance on Beijing's poverty reduction achievements, its management of the global Covid-19 pandemic, and sensitive domestic and regional political issues, like Xinjiang.⁵ Over the past decade, Beijing has provided training to large numbers of African journalists, funded media outlets on the continent, and signed content sharing agreements.⁶

While activities of “competitors” (like China) in the information space receive a lot of attention, at times European actors know comparatively less about the foreign audiences themselves and the topics of everyday life that capture the public's attention. For example, Kenya and its media environment receive international attention every five years during the presidential and parliamentary elections, but attention drops off sharply thereafter. Public opinion polling on foreign policy issues is very limited. *Afrobarometer* surveys provide some insight into broader opinion trends, but do not cover every day public discourse. Yet European actors need to relate their communication efforts to the issues that matter most to Kenyans if they are to reach their audience. One way to tune into public discourse is to analyse media coverage.

This Policy Brief explores the following questions: Which issues related to the EU/Europe and China have received the most attention in Kenyan newspapers over the past decade (2013–2023)? What do they reveal about public discourse? While the link between media coverage and public discourse is indirect, this brief suggests that a systematic analysis of the “Big Topics” provides insights into broader discursive trends, as Kenyan media outlets cover issues that are presumably most relevant to the Kenyan public. Secondary sources and background discussions with experts (including journalists, editors, and other professionals with knowledge of the public discourse on Kenya's external partnerships and European actors involved in strategic communication) conducted in Nairobi in April 2024 helped relate the results of the media screening to the public discourse.

Exploring “Big Topics”: Topic modelling

This Policy Brief presents the results of a large-scale media screening, supported by topic modelling (BERTopic). Topic modelling is an algorithm-based technique used to discover and group topics in texts based on their content. Approximately 12,500 articles from Kenyan newspapers between 1 January 2013 and 28 July 2023 were extracted using a news aggregator (sources: The Standard, Daily Nation, The East

³ Chloe Teevan and San Bilal, *The Global Gateway at Two: Implementing EU Strategic Ambitions* (ECDPM, 2023), Briefing Note no. 172.

⁴ Floor Keuleers, “Stories of Moral Actorship: European Union and Chinese Narratives Towards Africa,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 21, no. 4 (2016): 517-537; Freedom House, “Beijing's Global Media Influence 2022: Kenya”, *Freedom House*, 2022, accessed May 15, 2024.

⁵ Dani Madrid-Morales, “Sino-African Media Cooperation. An Overview of a Longstanding Asymmetric Relationship,” in *It is about their Story. How China, Turkey and Russia Influence the Media in Africa* (Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, 2021), 9-71.

⁶ Paul Nantulya, “China's Strategy to Shape Africa's Media Space”, *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, accessed April 16, 2024.

African, The Star, Business Daily). Articles on sports were excluded. The words “Europe/European/EU/European Union” or “China/Chinese/Sino” had to be matched at least twice for the article to be included in the sample. A first round of unsupervised topic modelling identified 35 topics for China and 30 topics for Europe. In second step, 698 articles were manually classified based on 12 merged topics. The topics were then used as training data in a supervised topic modelling (separately for China and Europe). Based on 130 additional out-of-sample evaluated articles, the final model had a classification accuracy (percentage of correct predictions) of about 82.7% for articles on China and 93.8% for articles on Europe. The significance of the results lies in the larger trend dynamics (regarding the amount of reporting) – not in the accurate classification or analysis of individual articles.

Kenya’s media landscape and external actors

Kenya is a regional news hub. The capital, Nairobi, is the preferred regional base of international media houses. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) operates its largest bureau outside of the United Kingdom (UK) there, training African journalists and producers and broadcasting in many African languages. Kenyan newspapers often carry content from international news agencies including *Reuters*, the *Associated Press*, *Agence France Press*, and American outlets such as the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*. This is particularly the case when they cover global affairs. China also has a strong media presence in Nairobi. The China Global Television Network (CGTN) operates its largest Africa bureau in the city, broadcasting on the continent. *Xinhua News Agency*, *Star Times*, *China Daily*, and China Radio International all have bureaus in Nairobi.⁷

In terms of press freedom and media diversity, Kenya compares favourably with its regional neighbours.⁸ While the social media discourse is particularly vibrant (especially among the youth), television, radio, and newspapers remain relevant news sources. Journalists report critically on sensitive government affairs and are moderately influential in placing issues of public interest on the political agenda.⁹ Kenyans are overall rather satisfied with the availability and quality of news and still have a relatively high level of trust in their media (61% say they trust most of the news),¹⁰ although as elsewhere the media landscape has been adversely affected by information interference campaigns and a decline in public trust.

However, despite its comparatively open media landscape, Freedom House classifies Kenya as “partly free”.¹¹ While journalists actively investigate government abuses and corruption, they risk harassment by security forces. Though vibrant, the media in Kenya is defined and associated with the political class and is characterized by a complex intertwining of ownership and control with political and economic structures.¹² In early 2024, the government decided to withdraw state advertisements from most print media, radio, and

⁷ For a more in-depth analysis of Kenya’s media landscape and China’s strategic media engagement, see: Hangwei Li, *Chinese Media Engagement with Africa and the Role of African Agency* (Megatrends, 2024), Policy Brief no. 26.

⁸ Meghan Sobel Cohen and Karen McIntyre Hopkinson, *Press Freedom and the (Crooked) Path Toward Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 73.

⁹ David Irwin and Njeri Kiereini, “Media influence on Public Policy in Kenya,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 59, no. 2 (2021): 159-173.

¹⁰ Global Disinformation Index, *The Online News Market in Kenya* (Global Disinformation Index, 2021), 23.


¹¹ Freedom House, “Kenya: Country Profile,” *Freedom House*, 2024, accessed May 15, 2024.

¹² George Ogola, “The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta’s Nation-Building Press to Kibaki’s Local-Language FM Radio,” *Africa Today* 57 no. 3 (2011): 77-95.

television stations and ran them only on the state-owned Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and in *The Star*, which is part of a commercial media conglomerate, the Radio Africa Group.¹³ The emergence of *The Star* as the sole distributor of government advertising means a significant reduction in revenue for other mainstream newspapers, which is likely to increase financial pressure on local media outlets to work with free content.¹⁴ The government's decision has been criticized by media professionals, one of whom described the decision as an attempt to “rein in the newspapers”.¹⁵ It is currently being challenged in court. While the analysis below focuses on topic modelling, current dynamics in the media sector are taken up again in the conclusions.

Media reporting on Europe and China in Kenya: Moderately increasing interest

The first graph shows the number of articles published in Kenyan newspapers from 2013–2023 that mentioned China, Europe/EU, or “the West”, as an indication of how much media attention these external actors received during the period.



Graph 1: Distribution of articles on China, Europa and the West, 2013-2023

The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian attack on Ukraine have received significant media attention with reference to China and the EU/Europe.

Overall, there is an upward trend in coverage of the EU/Europe and China in recent years. This is probably at least partly due to the dominance of international news wires in the coverage of global affairs. However, it also indicates a growing public interest, as Kenyan editors select content discussing China and Europe in the context of these global issues based on the assumed relevance for the Kenyan audience. For China, the graph shows an enormous peak in coverage (and to a lesser extent for Europe) during the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. For Europe, peaks since 2021 are likely related to the Russian attack on Ukraine. These topics are discussed in more detail in the sections below.

¹³ Macharia Kamau, “Government Withdraws State Adverts from Radio, TVs in Another Mortal Blow to Media Industry, *The Standard*, March 9, 2024, accessed June 4, 2024.


¹⁴ Freedom House, “Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022: Kenya”.

¹⁵ Background talk with Kenyan journalist/media expert, April 16, 2024, Nairobi.

A “West versus China” framing is not a prominent theme in the coverage.

In Graph 1, we have included not only Europe and China but also the collective term “the West” (rather than Europe, the UK, or US). We suggest that articles referring to “the West” instead of specific countries are more likely to be used in articles that apply a framing of power competition. As the graph shows, “the West” rarely appears in the coverage, although there is a slight increase in the use of the term since 2022, which coincides with increasing coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian attack on Ukraine. Nevertheless, the use of the term “the West” remains marginal in absolute terms. It is therefore excluded from the analysis.

Graph 2 shows the share of articles each year in the sample that mention Europe *and* China, rather than Europe *or* China. We suggest that these articles are more likely to discuss the actors in comparative or competitive terms.



Graph 2: Share of articles per year that mention the EU/Europe *and* China, 2013-2023

Coverage of Europe and China is largely actor-specific.

There is a slight increase in the number of articles mentioning both actors in 2022 and 2023. Most articles dealing with China *and* Europe are associated with topics about global affairs (~14%), the Covid-19 pandemic (~11%), and trade (~7%), followed by articles in other categories (~21%), such as Kenyan foreign policy, regional affairs, and financing and loans. However, the share of articles mentioning both actors remains marginal, averaging 4.3%. So, a “Europe/EU versus China” framing does not seem to be a prominent theme in the coverage. Other research contributions also suggest that the overall public perception of external influence in African countries tend to be either positive or negative, rather than competitive or a zero-sum game.¹⁶

The local impact of geopolitics matters, not global power competition itself.


Interviews revealed that the lack of comparative perspective does not mean that geopolitics are not important to the Kenyan audience. First, power competition is perceived primarily between China and the US, not China and the EU/Europe. Second, the impact of

¹⁶ For example, Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Edem E. Selormey, *Africans Welcome China's Influence but Maintain Democratic Aspirations* (Afrobarometer, 2021), Dispatch no. 489, 23.

geopolitical developments on Kenya and the region matters (e.g. resource flows such as investments, costs of imports, and risk of proxy wars), not the power competition itself. As a result, coverage tends to be actor-specific (China or Europe), even though geopolitical competition may be a relevant underlying theme.

“Big Topics” in the coverage of the EU/Europe

Below, we explore issues that have dominated the news about the EU/Europe and China over the period 2013–2023, starting with an overview for Europe. The topics linking the EU/Europe to global affairs, Kenyan diplomacy and socio-political controversies are discussed in more detail. As we have combined the EU and Europe in the topic modelling, we also discuss the scope and limitations of the results.



Graph 3: Topic distribution among articles with reference to the EU/Europe, 2013–2023 (absolute numbers)

The war in Ukraine has drawn attention to the EU’s role in global affairs.

While the number of articles mentioning the EU/Europe in global affairs was less than 10 per month before 2021, indicating low interest compared to other topics (e.g. European domestic politics, trade, and investment relations, and the EU’s role in African politics), it has shot up to more than 100 articles per month since 2021. The sharp increase is likely linked with the Russian attack on Ukraine, which led to major changes in European foreign and security policy approaches, as well as the growing confrontation with Russia. This has led to a lot of media attention in Kenya. However, the reference to Europe could be partly geographical (“war in Europe”). While political leaders including the Kenyan president have spoken in support of Ukraine and highlighted the impact of global conflicts on the local economy (i.e. grain imports), no robust data on public perceptions of Europe’s role in the conflict is available to date. More coverage on global affairs therefore does not in itself tell us much in this case.

Still, the sharp increase suggests a high level of public attention, which is relevant for European communication efforts. Interviews provided additional insights: European actors involved in strategic communication confirm that they increasingly have to explain and justify what the EU is doing in the world. Moreover, even areas of development cooperation that were previously discussed with the Kenyan government and civil society in a technical, consensus-oriented manner have become politicised. These developments suggest that engaging with public discourse in Kenya has become more challenging and more political, as it is not only about seeking positive coverage of European trade, investment, and development cooperation in Kenya, but is also about reacting to criticism about the political role of the EU and its Member States in globally divisive conflicts.

Europe takes diplomatic action, with limited recognition.

European diplomatic efforts in Kenya appear to be paying off to some extent. The number of articles mentioning the EU/Europe in relation to Kenyan foreign policy, trade and investment, and financing/loans/debt has increased significantly since 2022. It is likely beneficial if the EU is viewed as more active in Kenya, as the EU seeks to increase the visibility and recognition of its activities in Kenya. Having been encouraged to do so, European actors are likely to have been more proactive in promoting their projects and investments. The increased coverage coincides with diplomatic visits by political leaders and ministers from the EU and its Member States, including EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. These visits often included announcements of trade and investment deals.

However, Kenyan media experts still assess the overall coverage of the EU's activities in the country as limited. Despite the EU's role as the most important trading partner, EU activities are rarely featured in editorial shows on broadcast media or in opinion editorials in the newspapers. Even around the landmark EPA, communication efforts were not as pronounced as expected. Despite efforts to gain visibility on social media, European communication efforts are perceived to still mostly happen on traditional EU-affiliated platforms that engage the "legacy media" (i.e. print media, radio, television) resulting in limited recognition, especially among younger generations favouring social media.

Socio-political controversies run through the coverage of Europe, adding to the challenge.

In contrast to the other topics, where the results do not indicate if the coverage is positive or negative, we suggest that the coverage of socio-political controversies tends to be critical/negative. Overall, controversies with reference to the EU/Europe have gained moderate attention throughout the period, suggesting continued public interest. Similar to the coverage of China (see Graph 4), coverage of controversies related to the EU/Europe dropped in 2021, when the global Covid-19 pandemic absorbed the public's attention, but has since returned to the level of moderate attention.

The topic encompasses various sub-themes including articles on restrictive European migration and asylum policies, disputes over colonial legacies and the return of African artefacts, and more recent disagreements over energy justice issues arising in different countries. A significant number of articles deals with controversies around some European products and standards that are seen as harmful for local African markets. Moreover, the signings of pacts and trade deals have often raised controversies around what Kenya gains from such pacts, the bearing on the other regional blocs' commitments, and impacts on the


local economy.¹⁷ According to media experts, the EU has not been perceived as communicating effectively on these agreements, including the EPA, while the Kenyan government tends to remain secretive about them.

Unpacking these various sub-themes of controversies associated with the EU/Europe is beyond the scope of this article. However, addressing issues of public concern is crucial for European actors seeking to develop and communicate compelling messages that resonate with the public about the EU/Europe in the world and European cooperation in Kenya.

“Big Topics” in the coverage on China

The next graph shows the main topics in the Kenyan newspapers related to China (2013–2023). The topics linking China to socio-political controversies, Chinese domestic and regional affairs, and Chinese megaprojects in Kenya are discussed below.

The excerpt highlights the enormous media attention for the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in relation to China, reflecting the overall reporting trend visualized in Graph 1.



Graph 4: Topic distribution among articles with reference to China, 2013–2023 (absolute numbers)

Crisis of reputation and the outbreak of the global pandemic.

Socio-political controversies have been dominant in the coverage of China over the period of 2013–2023. Interviews suggest that in 2018/2019, where the topic peaks, China was experiencing a reputational crisis in Kenya related to numerous issues covered under this topic,

¹⁷ For example, Anami Luke, “Why EAC Members are Wary of Kenya’s latest Trade Deal with EU“, *The East African*, July 3, 2023.

including lawsuits against Chinese companies and businessmen, reports of poor working conditions at Chinese construction sites, poaching, and illegal fishing. Between 2016 and 2019, the “dept trap” narrative was also quite prominent in the coverage of Chinese investment in Kenya. The outbreak of the global pandemic in 2020 absorbed all of the public’s attention. Research has shown that Kenyan coverage of China’s role in the pandemic was critical, citing for example discrimination of Africans in Guangzhou.¹⁸ Moreover, Chinese media cooperation was found to have had a limited impact, as only 0.5% text of Kenyan coverage on the pandemic was reused from Chinese media.¹⁹

However, Chinese in Kenya kept a very low profile during the pandemic and face-to-face interactions came to a halt, leading to a sharp drop in attention to controversies related to Chinese business practices in the country (low point in 2021). Moreover, since 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi reportedly engaged more actively with the local media. The newly arrived ambassador set out to publish opinion pieces and increased social media activity.²⁰ However, as the coverage of controversies re-emerged as one of the most prominent topics when the pandemic gradually disappeared from the news, the level of Chinese influence on public discourse in Kenya seems to remain limited.

Chinese domestic and regional issues are receiving increasing media attention.

Next to coverage of China in global affairs, the coverage of Chinese domestic and regional politics has risen sharply in recent years, including reporting on Chinese party politics, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. This is relevant because Chinese media strategies are likely to seek to control such media coverage, by restricting foreign access and censoring information on the internet.²¹ Our graph shows that any attempts of suppressing (i.e. reducing) coverage of sensitive domestic and regional matters were not successful. However, it does not show if the coverage were critical or favourable.

Secondary sources and interviews provided additional insights. According to Freedom House, Kenyan media outlets covered critical human rights reports on Xinjiang.²² While the coverage consisted mostly of wire stories (not locally produced content), they were selected by Kenyan media editors who decided to publish them. Moreover, interviews highlighted that while many Kenyan journalists and media professionals have undergone training in China, which may have led to increased coverage (e.g. the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party), they do not necessarily opt for favourable coverage and are likely to return with critical perspectives. The findings are consistent with previous research suggesting a rather low level of Chinese influence on the Kenyan media coverage.²³

Megaprojects strongly influence public opinion.

The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) has attracted so much Kenyan media attention that it became its own “big topic” for China. The story of Kenya’s most expensive Chinese funded infrastructure project has been told numerous times. Kenyan megaprojects receive a lot of media scrutiny and have a major impact on public opinion.²⁴

¹⁸ Hangwei Li, “Media Representation of China in the Time of Pandemic: A comparative study of Kenyan and Ethiopian media,” *Journal of African Media Studies* 13, no. 3 (2021): 417-434.

¹⁹ Dani Madrid-Morales, “Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Global Media on News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries,” *Global Media and China* 6, no. 2 (2021).

²⁰ Freedom House, “Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022: Kenya”.

²¹ Vincent Brussee and Kai von Carnap, *The Increasing Challenge of Obtaining Information from Xi’s China* (MERICS, 2024), 25.

²² Freedom House, “Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022: Kenya”.

²³ Hangwei Li, “Understanding African Journalistic Agency in China–Africa Media Interactions: The Case of Kenya,” *International Communication Gazette* 85, no. 1 (2023).

²⁴ Müller-Mahn, Detlef, Kennedy Mkutu, and Eric Kioko, “Megaprojects—Mega Failures? The Politics of Aspiration and the Transformation of Rural Kenya,” *The European Journal of Development Research* 33 (2021): 1069–1090.

Over the years, the SGR has been both good and bad news for China. Beijing has gained visibility as a major investor, but critical coverage related to corruption, high construction costs, and a lack of transparency, amongst other things, has been widespread. The coverage of the SGR has raised Kenyans' "everyday anxieties" about China and Chinese in the country.²⁵ Overall, Beijing continues to struggle with the close link between the railway's questionable economic viability, Kenya's public debt, and China's reputation in Kenya. Kenyan journalists have reported instances of interference from China and the Kenyan government to suppress critical reporting, but with apparently very limited or no success.

Conclusions and policy recommendations

The coverage of the EU/Europe and China in the Kenyan media shows consistencies as well as sharp changes over the past decade. Topics such as investment and trade remain of high interest. In contrast, "softer" topics such as cultural cooperation, tourism, and (to a lesser extent) development cooperation – areas of cooperation that have traditionally played an important role in public diplomacy and communication efforts – have consistently attracted less attention. Coverage of global affairs with reference to the EU/Europe and China, however, has risen sharply. These developments pose new challenges to European actors engaged in communication efforts.

European actors need to increasingly consider the EU's role in global political affairs and socio-political controversies in Kenya.

Strategic communication needs to do more than showcasing European activities in the country. The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian attack on Ukraine have sparked media coverage of the EU/Europe's role in the context of global affairs, as well as in relation to wider issues of public concern, such as Kenya's economic development and sustainable debt management. Addressing issues of public concern, including critical views on the EU's political role in divisive conflicts and the local impact of EU decisions, products, and standards in the region is important for European actors seeking to relate their communication efforts to the issues that matter most to Kenyan citizens.

A "West versus China" framing does not resonate with the public.

Concern among European actors about China's influence on the African media landscape remains high. In the case of Kenya, however, Chinese influence on the Kenyan (print) news was found to be limited at best, confirming previous research suggesting that the Chinese media presence in African countries does not equate to influence (albeit with regional variations).²⁶ The importance attached to China as a "competitor" in Kenya's information environment should therefore be tempered. Various European actors on the ground have already started focusing their communication on the transformative nature and local impact of investments, such as in the context of the Global Gateway (as opposed to the geopolitical rationale that is more prominent in the Brussels discourse).

²⁵ Wangui Kimari, "Under Construction?: Everyday Anxieties and the Proliferating Social Meanings of China in Kenya," *Africa* 91, no. 1 (2021); Li, Hangwei and Yuan Wang, *African Media Cultures and Chinese Public Relations Strategies in Kenya and Ethiopia* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023), 29.

²⁶ Dani Madrid-Morales, "Who Set the Narrative?"; Wasserman, Herman and Dani Madrid-Morales, "How Influential Are Chinese Media in Africa? An Audience Analysis in Kenya and South Africa." *International Journal of Communication* 12 (2018).

An open and diverse media environment is essential for European actors wishing to engage in public discourse in Kenya.

The “legacy” media remains an important interlocutor for European communication efforts. Despite a relatively high level of resilience, actors in the media landscape are confronted with economic challenges and a loss of public trust (see above: Kenya’s media landscape) – challenges shared by media professionals in other countries, including Germany. European actors could support peer-to-peer exchanges between media professionals from Kenya and Europe to help deal with these challenges, thereby contributing to information exchange and strengthening the resilience of the media sectors.

Dr Karoline Eickhoff is a Researcher at Megatrends Afrika and an Associate with the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP. Paul Bochtler is a Data Analyst for International Economics and Statistics at SWP. Hesbon Hansen Owilla is a Research Lead and faculty member at the Aga Khan University’s Graduate School of Media and Communications in Nairobi.

Megatrends Afrika

is a joint project of SWP, IDOS and IfW.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

All project publications are subject to an internal peer review process.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

SWP

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik | German Institute for International and Security Affairs

IDOS German Institute of Development and Sustainability

IfW Kiel Institute for the World Economy

www.megatrends-afrika.de
megatrends-afrika@swp-berlin.org

ISSN 2747-4119

DOI 10.18449/2024MTA-PB27



Funded by:

